US Considers Nationalising Rare Earths for Enhanced National Security

American flag, rare earth elements, wind turbines.

Understanding Rare Earth Elements and Their Critical Role in National Defense

Rare earth elements represent seventeen chemically similar metallic elements that have become the backbone of modern military technology. The prospect of whether to U.S. nationalize rare earths national security represents one of the most significant strategic decisions facing American policymakers today. These materials possess unique magnetic, luminescent, and electrochemical properties that cannot be easily substituted in advanced defense systems.

The defense applications of these critical minerals are staggering in scope. A single F-35 Lightning II fighter jet requires approximately 920 pounds of rare earth materials, primarily for magnets in engines, actuators, and sensor systems. Virginia-class submarines demand even more, utilizing roughly 9,200 pounds of rare earth elements per vessel for their sophisticated propulsion and navigation systems.

Defense Technology Dependencies

The strategic importance extends across virtually every modern weapons platform. Precision-guided munitions rely heavily on neodymium-iron-boron magnets for their guidance systems, while advanced radar equipment depends on these materials for signal processing capabilities.

Each element serves specific defense functions:

• Neodymium: Powers permanent magnets in jet engines and missile fin actuators
• Dysprosium: Enables high-temperature magnet applications in defense electronics
• Erbium: Critical for fiber-optic communications and range-finding systems
• Europium: Essential for night-vision equipment phosphors
• Terbium: Required for sonar systems and precision actuators

The Department of Defense identified rare earths as critical components in over 200 weapon systems, though specific system classifications remain protected for national security reasons.

Beyond Military Applications

While defense applications capture headlines, rare earth elements power civilian infrastructure that supports national security objectives. Electric vehicle manufacturing, renewable energy systems, and advanced telecommunications networks all depend on steady supplies of these materials.

This dual-use nature creates additional vulnerabilities. Supply disruptions would simultaneously impact military readiness and economic competitiveness in emerging technology sectors essential for long-term strategic positioning.

China's Strategic Domination of Global Supply Chains

China's control over rare earth supply chains represents one of the most significant examples of strategic resource dominance in modern history. This dominance emerged through decades of deliberate government policy rather than simple geological advantage.

Historical Development Timeline

The foundation of Chinese rare earth strategy traces back to the 1980s, when leadership recognised the strategic potential of these materials. By the 1990s and 2000s, China systematically consolidated domestic mining operations while Western competitors faced mounting environmental compliance costs and price competition.

The turning point came in 2010 when China reduced export quotas by 40%, causing rare earth prices to spike by factors of ten for some elements. This demonstration of market power sent shockwaves through Western defense establishments and technology companies.

Current Market Control Statistics

China's market dominance extends across every stage of the supply chain:

Supply Chain Stage Chinese Market Share
Mining Operations 70% of global production
Processing and Refining 85-90% of global capacity
Magnet Manufacturing 93% of worldwide production

As of 2023, China produced approximately 240,000 metric tons of rare earth elements, dwarfing production from all other nations combined. More critically, China controls the complex chemical processing required to transform raw ore into usable materials for manufacturing.

Strategic Consolidation Methods

China's success resulted from coordinated government industrial policy that Western nations chose not to match. State-owned enterprises consolidated the sector while accepting environmental externalities that Western companies and governments found politically unacceptable.

The Congressional Research Service notes that this dominance stems from processing expertise and environmental tradeoffs rather than exclusive geological abundance. Consequently, the United States possesses substantial rare earth deposits but abandoned the processing infrastructure necessary to compete.

Critical National Security Vulnerabilities from Foreign Dependence

The concentration of rare earth processing in China creates multiple layers of national security risk that extend beyond simple supply shortages. Furthermore, this dependency creates critical questions about whether the critical minerals & security strategy requires more aggressive intervention.

Defense Supply Chain Exposure

Approximately 80% of imported rare earth compounds and metals for U.S. defense applications originated from China between 2018 and 2021. This dependency creates immediate vulnerabilities in weapons production and maintenance.

The 2010 incident with Japan demonstrated how quickly rare earth exports can become diplomatic weapons. China temporarily halted shipments following a maritime territorial dispute, proving that supply cutoffs represent viable tools of economic warfare.

Intelligence Collection Opportunities

Supply chain monitoring provides intelligence gathering capabilities that extend far beyond simple commercial relationships. Knowledge of defense contractor procurement patterns, production schedules, and technological development timelines offers strategic advantages to foreign adversaries.

The RAND Corporation identified this intelligence risk as equally significant to supply disruption threats, noting that embedded monitoring capabilities could provide early warning of U.S. military production increases or technological developments.

Processing Bottlenecks

Even more concerning than mining dependencies are processing vulnerabilities. The United States currently lacks domestic capacity for processing heavy rare earth elements like dysprosium and terbium, which are absolutely critical for advanced military magnets used in high-temperature applications.

Mountain Pass mine in California resumed operations in 2018 but initially shipped all ore concentrate to China for processing due to lack of domestic separation capabilities. This arrangement highlighted the difference between ore production and strategic independence.

Government Response to Supply Chain Risks

U.S. policymakers have implemented various initiatives to address rare earth vulnerabilities, though comprehensive solutions remain years away. In addition, recent developments including Trump's critical minerals order have intensified discussions about national control over these resources.

Historical Policy Framework

The Trump administration established the foundation for rare earth supply chain security through multiple executive orders. Executive Order 13817 in December 2017 created a federal strategy for critical minerals, while Executive Order 13953 in September 2020 specifically addressed threats from foreign adversaries.

The Biden administration expanded these efforts through Executive Order 14017 in February 2021, initiating comprehensive supply chain reviews that included rare earth elements as priority materials.

Department of Defense Investment Programs

The Defense Department has utilised multiple funding mechanisms to support domestic rare earth capabilities. In September 2022, MP Materials received a $35 million contract for heavy rare earth oxide processing development, though this represents a fraction of the investment required for comprehensive independence.

The Defense Production Act Title III program has become the primary vehicle for rare earth investments, with the Pentagon exploring direct investment, offtake agreements, and loan guarantees to rebuild domestic processing capabilities.

Timeline Challenges

The Government Accountability Office concluded that rebuilding domestic rare earth processing capability would require 5 to 15 years and billions in investment to achieve independence from Chinese processing. Heavy rare earth processing presents the most significant technical challenges, while light rare earth processing could be achieved in 3 to 7 years given existing Mountain Pass operations.

Disclaimer: Policy timelines and investment figures are based on government estimates and may vary significantly based on funding availability, regulatory approvals, and technical challenges.

Examining Full Nationalization Models

Complete government ownership of rare earth operations would represent a dramatic departure from market-based approaches, requiring careful analysis of historical precedents and implementation challenges. However, the US mineral production order suggests increasing government intervention in critical materials sectors.

Historical Precedents for Strategic Industry Control

The Manhattan Project provides the most relevant example of comprehensive government control over critical materials production. From 1942 to 1946, the federal government nationalised uranium processing and created an integrated weapons production complex with approximately $2 billion in investment, equivalent to roughly $30 billion in current dollars.

The Defense Production Act invocations during the Korean War temporarily nationalised certain steel production, though this was later ruled unconstitutional in the landmark Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer case.

Infrastructure Requirements for Complete Independence

Full nationalisation would require government control over five distinct stages:

  1. Mining operations (existing at Mountain Pass, potential sites in Texas and Wyoming)
  2. Ore processing and separation facilities
  3. Oxide-to-metal conversion plants
  4. Metal alloying and magnet manufacturing
  5. Recycling and secondary recovery facilities

Each stage demands specialised expertise, environmental permits, and substantial capital investment. The oxide-to-metal conversion represents the most technically challenging step currently lacking in U.S. infrastructure.

International Comparison Models

Australia's approach through Northern Rare Earths Limited partnership with government research agency ANSTO represents a hybrid model, providing government technical expertise without direct ownership. This model offers strategic control while maintaining private sector efficiency incentives.

However, comprehensive data on full government ownership models remains limited, as most nations have opted for hybrid approaches rather than complete nationalisation.

Economic Analysis of Nationalization Arguments

The economic case for rare earth nationalisation involves complex tradeoffs between security benefits and market efficiency concerns. Moreover, understanding whether to U.S. nationalize rare earths national security requires evaluating these economic implications alongside strategic objectives.

Market Size and Employment Considerations

The global rare earth market reached approximately $7.8 billion in 2023, with U.S. consumption representing roughly 14% of global demand. While substantial, this market size is relatively modest compared to other strategic industries.

Employment impacts would be significant for affected regions. Mountain Pass mine currently employs 400-500 workers, while a fully integrated domestic supply chain could create 1,500-2,500 direct jobs plus additional indirect employment in supporting industries.

Financial Benefits Assessment

Potential Advantage Expected Impact
Price Stability Reduced vulnerability to market manipulation
Strategic Reserves Enhanced buffer against supply disruptions
Technology Development Accelerated domestic innovation
Regional Employment Long-term job security in mining communities

Market Efficiency Concerns

Resources for the Future analysis suggests that government ownership typically results in higher costs and slower innovation compared to competitive markets. Hybrid approaches using strategic stockpiling, long-term contracts, and subsidies for private development may achieve security objectives with superior economic efficiency.

Historical examples of nationalised rare earth industries, including the Soviet Union's experience in the 1980s, demonstrated potential inefficiencies, though comprehensive comparative data remains limited in English-language sources.

Strategic Stockpiling Costs

The National Defense Stockpile historically maintained rare earth reserves but depleted them during the 1990s and 2000s. Rebuilding strategic reserves would require determining target quantities based on 1-3 year supply buffers for critical defense applications, considering storage limitations since some rare earth products degrade or oxidise over time.

Disclaimer: Economic projections involve significant uncertainty based on technological developments, market conditions, and policy implementation effectiveness.

International Allied Cooperation Frameworks

Collaboration with allied nations offers alternative pathways to reduce Chinese dependence without complete domestic self-sufficiency. This approach aligns with broader trends in mining industry innovation that emphasise international partnerships.

U.S.-Australia Strategic Partnership

The Australia-U.S. Critical Minerals Compact, announced in 2022, committed the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide up to $2 billion in financing for Australian critical mineral projects. This partnership leverages Australia's position as the world's second-largest rare earth producer, generating approximately 18,000 metric tons of rare earth oxides annually.

Lynas Rare Earths received $30.4 million from the Department of Defense in 2020 for heavy rare earth processing facility development in Texas, demonstrating practical implementation of allied cooperation strategies.

NATO Alliance Coordination

The NATO Supply Agency initiated a Critical Materials Working Group in 2021 to assess alliance-wide vulnerabilities in rare earth supply chains for defense systems. This framework enables burden-sharing arrangements that could provide strategic redundancy without individual nation self-sufficiency requirements.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that allied coordination represents the most viable near-term strategy, noting that collective allied capacity could provide strategic redundancy since no single country can rapidly rebuild comprehensive processing capabilities.

Canadian Technical Cooperation

Canada's Saskatchewan Research Council operates a small-scale rare earth processing demonstration facility and has signed memoranda of understanding with U.S. entities. However, commercial-scale production has not materialised as of 2024, highlighting the challenges of scaling demonstration projects to industrial capacity.

Environmental and Regulatory Implementation Challenges

Nationalisation would require addressing complex environmental and legal frameworks that historically contributed to Western abandonment of rare earth processing. Additionally, the broader context of US-China trade impacts adds urgency to resolving these regulatory challenges.

Environmental Impact Management

Rare earth processing generates significant environmental challenges, including radioactive waste management and acid mine drainage. Government ownership would not eliminate these issues but would shift responsibility from private entities to federal agencies.

The environmental compliance costs that drove Western companies from rare earth processing in the 1990s and 2000s would become government responsibilities under nationalisation, requiring substantial budgetary commitments for proper waste management.

Regulatory Jurisdiction Complexities

Federal ownership would create complex jurisdictional issues between federal and state environmental authorities. Indigenous land rights and consultation processes would require careful navigation, particularly for potential mining sites in western states.

International trade law implications under World Trade Organisation rules could complicate government ownership structures, particularly if nationalised production received subsidies that private competitors could challenge.

Permitting Timeline Challenges

The regulatory approval process for new rare earth processing facilities typically requires 3-5 years under current frameworks. Government ownership might accelerate some approvals through federal coordination but could face additional scrutiny regarding environmental impact assessments.

Global Market Implications of U.S. Self-Sufficiency

American rare earth nationalisation would fundamentally alter global market dynamics and geopolitical relationships. Furthermore, the U.S. is working to secure rare earth supply chains as China tightens its grip amid ongoing trade tensions.

Geopolitical Power Shifts

U.S. rare earth independence would significantly reduce Chinese leverage in international negotiations, potentially triggering retaliatory measures through export restrictions on other critical materials or technologies.

China might respond by accelerating rare earth supply agreements with other nations, potentially offering preferential terms to maintain market influence and isolate U.S. strategic objectives.

Global Pricing Dynamics

Government-owned U.S. production could stabilise global rare earth prices by providing alternative supply sources, though the transition period might experience increased volatility as markets adjust to new supply patterns.

Market disruption risks exist for current private sector players, particularly companies that have invested in processing capabilities expecting continued Chinese supply chain integration.

Technology Innovation Effects

Government funding could accelerate research and development in rare earth processing technologies, potentially creating intellectual property advantages. However, patent protection and technology transfer policies would require careful consideration to balance innovation incentives with national security concerns.

The potential for breakthrough processing technologies under government funding could eventually reduce the strategic importance of traditional rare earth supply chains, fundamentally altering global competitive dynamics.

Implementation Timeline and Success Metrics

Successful rare earth nationalisation would require carefully structured phases with measurable objectives and adaptive strategies. The decision of whether to U.S. nationalize rare earths national security must consider realistic implementation timeframes.

Short-Term Objectives (1-3 Years)

Initial implementation would focus on expanding existing domestic mining operations and beginning processing facility construction. The Mountain Pass facility provides a foundation, but significant modernisation and expansion would be necessary.

Workforce development represents a critical early priority, requiring technical training programs for specialised chemical processing skills that have atrophied in the United States over past decades.

Key milestones would include:

• Year 1: Facility design and environmental permitting initiation
• Year 2: Construction commencement and workforce recruitment
• Year 3: Initial processing capability for light rare earth elements

Long-Term Strategic Goals (5-10 Years)

Complete supply chain independence would require mastery of heavy rare earth processing, which presents the most significant technical challenges. Strategic reserve establishment and maintenance protocols would need development during this period.

Technology leadership in advanced rare earth applications could position the United States as a global innovator rather than simply achieving import substitution.

Success metrics would include:

• Processing capacity: Domestic capability for 100% of defense requirements
• Strategic reserves: 2-3 year supply buffer for critical applications
• Technology development: Patent leadership in next-generation processing methods
• Cost competitiveness: Production costs within 15-20% of Chinese alternatives

Disclaimer: Timeline projections are subject to significant variation based on funding availability, regulatory approvals, technical challenges, and market conditions.

Evaluating Strategic Alternatives to Full Nationalization

Complete government ownership represents only one approach among multiple strategies for achieving rare earth security objectives. Indeed, the question of whether to U.S. nationalize rare earths national security must be weighed against alternative approaches.

Public-Private Partnership Models

Hybrid structures could combine government strategic oversight with private sector operational efficiency. These arrangements might involve government equity stakes, long-term purchasing agreements, and shared technology development programs.

The current MP Materials relationship with the Department of Defense demonstrates early-stage partnership potential, though comprehensive evaluation requires longer operational history.

Market-Based Incentive Approaches

Tax incentives, regulatory streamlining, and research grants could stimulate private sector rare earth development without direct government ownership. These approaches might achieve security objectives while maintaining competitive market dynamics.

Strategic stockpiling without operational control could provide supply security buffers while allowing market forces to drive efficiency improvements and technological innovation.

Adaptive Implementation Strategies

Rather than committing to permanent nationalisation, policies could incorporate sunset clauses and performance reviews. If private sector capabilities develop sufficiently, government ownership could transition to strategic oversight roles.

Graduated approaches might begin with government ownership of the most critical processing stages while maintaining private sector involvement in mining and finished product manufacturing.

Critical Decision Framework for Policymakers

The choice between nationalisation and alternative approaches requires weighing multiple strategic, economic, and practical considerations.

Urgency Assessment

Current supply chain vulnerabilities create immediate national security risks that may justify extraordinary measures typically avoided during peacetime. The 5-15 year timeline for building domestic processing capabilities suggests that interim solutions will be necessary regardless of long-term strategy choices.

Chinese export restrictions and geopolitical tensions add urgency to decision-making timelines, potentially making gradual approaches insufficient for national security requirements.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Factors

Government ownership ensures strategic control but historically demonstrates higher costs and slower innovation compared to competitive markets. The national security benefits may justify these economic tradeoffs, but comprehensive cost accounting should include opportunity costs and long-term market impact.

Private sector efficiency advantages must be weighed against vulnerability to market manipulation, supply disruption, and foreign intelligence collection through commercial relationships.

Long-Term Strategic Positioning

U.S. rare earth strategy will influence broader geopolitical competition with China and relationships with allied nations. Nationalisation signals commitment to strategic independence but might complicate trade relationships and technology cooperation agreements.

The precedent set by rare earth nationalisation could influence approaches to other critical materials and technologies, making this decision significant beyond immediate supply chain concerns.

Future technological developments, including potential rare earth substitutes or recycling breakthroughs, could dramatically alter the strategic landscape within implementation timeframes. Adaptive strategies that can respond to technological changes may prove more valuable than rigid nationalisation commitments.

The path forward requires balancing immediate security needs with long-term economic efficiency, technological innovation, and international cooperation objectives. Success will likely depend on policy flexibility and continuous assessment of evolving strategic conditions rather than permanent commitment to any single approach.

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on publicly available information through April 2024 and cannot account for subsequent policy developments or market changes. Strategic decision-making should incorporate the most current intelligence and market conditions available to policymakers.

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Discovery Alert does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the information provided in its articles. The information does not constitute financial or investment advice. Readers are encouraged to conduct their own due diligence or speak to a licensed financial advisor before making any investment decisions.

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